Where the rules may not match the statutes: 1,398 candidates awaiting human review

ORS 181A.170 requires use of electronic fingerprint capture technology for criminal records checks, but OAR 125-007-0220(3) permits traditional fingerprint cards from minors, which may not be electronic capture.

OAR 125-007-0220 specifies information required for criminal records checks without differentiating by category, contrary to the statute's requirement to specify information 'for each category'

OAR 125-007-0270 specifies types of crimes uniformly across all categories without differentiating by category, contrary to the statute's requirement to specify crimes 'for each category'

Rule broadens the definition of "Housing" by allowing tenancy on other than monthly basis, while statute limits to monthly tenancy.

Rule narrows the definition of "Dormitory" by limiting it to Mental Health Division employees, while statute includes both Department of Human Services and Oregon Health Authority employees.

Rule adds a date qualifier "prior to September 9, 1971" to the exclusion of Chancellor furniture from the "Furnishings" definition, which the statute does not contain, thereby narrowing the exclusion.

All three rules declare ORS 184.340 as a statute they implement, but their operative text never engages with or references ORS 184.340—a general authorization statute, not a substantive provision to be implemented.

OAR 125-700-0140(6) requires completed risk assessments and internal audits to be filed with the Secretary of State's Audits Division, but ORS 184.360(5) requires agencies to file reports with the Oregon Department of Administrative Services.

Rule 125-045-0211 declares it implements ORS 184.634 but establishes exemptions from reporting requirements, not procedures and criteria for disposition as the statute authorizes.

Rule 125-045-0212 declares it implements ORS 184.634 but addresses exemptions from the Clearinghouse Process and PLAC review, not procedures and criteria for disposition as the statute authorizes.

The rule declares it implements ORS 184.345, which authorizes DAS to provide administrative services on a reimbursable basis to state agencies, but the rule's operative text establishes a Charitable Fund Drive Committee structure and functions unrelated to that authorization.

The rule declares it implements ORS 184.305, but that statute addresses only the Oregon Department of Administrative Services' general purposes (infrastructure services, rules, performance measurement, training, personnel systems, management information, and financial systems), not charitable organizations or charitable fund drive participation requirements that the rule regulates.

A statute and its implementing OregonBuys-reporting rule cite different four-digit ORS sections (660.334 vs. 660.342) for the same category of intergovernmental agreement.

Systemic pattern: relationships.implements is built from legal_authority rather than statutes_implemented across nearly every rule in this cluster, producing internally contradictory frontmatter within single documents (e.g. OAR 125-090-0000 omits ORS 98.805 from implements despite it heading statutes_implemented).

The rule restricts reporting requirements to 'state agency' but the statute allows any 'public body as defined in ORS 174.109' to enter into security function agreements.

OAR 125-090-0002 declares it implements ORS 190.240 (furnishing services to federal and local governmental units), but the rule's operative text addresses only regulation of parking facilities and transportation uses, never engaging with that statute.

The rule authorizes agreements with entities in other countries ('International Agreements'), but the statute limits agreements to 'public agency in another state,' which means U.S. states, not foreign countries.

Rule 125-246-0365 authorizes Interstate Agreements in section 2, but ORS 190.485 limits authority only to agreements with "a nation or a public agency in any nation other than the United States," excluding interstate agreements.

OAR 125-246-0210(4)(b)(B) explicitly limits disqualification grounds to subsections (a)-(c) of ORS 200.075(1), but the statute lists four prohibited acts in subsections (a)-(d).

OAR 125-045-0200 declares it implements ORS 244.010 (a public ethics policy statute) but the operative text concerns only real property acquisition, disposition, and inventory procedures with no engagement with public ethics principles.

OAR 125-045-0205 declares it implements ORS 244.010 (public ethics policy) but the operative text contains only real property definitions with no connection to public ethics or trust principles.

ODOT's public-notice rule requires less publication than the statute demands for the same value band, while DAS's rule implementing the same statute matches the statute exactly.

[batch 1 only] A DAS rule defines two statutory cross-reference terms differently than the statute's own definitions section, while a third parallel term in the same rule matches exactly.

Rule 125-045-0265(1) permits a "hosting Agency" to maintain the state land inventory in addition to or instead of DAS, while the statute requires only DAS to maintain it.

OAR 125-045-0230(2) makes granting right of first refusal discretionary while ORS 270.010(2) establishes it as mandatory state policy.

Rule 125-045-0221(4)(f) and 125-045-0222(2) establish that Political Subdivisions' rights to negotiate for acquisition are subordinate to Nonprofit Organizations and Indian Tribes, but ORS 270.100(1)(b)(A) gives both groups equal 'first opportunity after other state agencies' status without establishing such a hierarchy.

The rule omits the statute's mandatory 'shall be made' language for reimbursement, replacing it with softer language 'are subject to,' which does not create an affirmative obligation to reimburse.

Rule 125-045-0205(45) defines 'Urban growth boundary' by reference to ORS 195.060, but the statute requires reference to ORS 197.015.

Rule 125-045-0205(46) defines 'Urban reserve' by reference to ORS 195.145, but the statute requires reference to ORS 197A.245.

OAR 125-045-0250 declares it implements ORS 270.190, but the rule text addresses only the Public Lands Advisory Committee structure, meetings, and member compensation—not the revenue transfer from the Operating Fund to the Capital Projects Fund that ORS 270.190 requires.

Rule 0214(7) triggers public notice obligation at "$100,000 or more" but statute requires it only if value is "greater than $100,000".

Rule 0214(7) exempts compliance with the statutory requirement to consider values and invite public comment based on exemptions listed in 0211, but those exemptions in 0211(2) apply only to obtaining Department approval, a separate requirement.

Rule 0211 declares it implements ORS 273.099, but ORS 270.015(2) only authorizes rules for ORS 184.634, 270.005 to 270.015, 270.100 to 270.190, 273.416, 273.426 to 273.436 and 273.551 — ORS 273.099 is not included in that list.

OAR 125-045-0260(3) gives the PLAC mandatory approval authority over appraisals and fair market value determinations, but ORS 270.120(6) limits the committee to an advisory role on property transactions.

A DAS rule redefines 'Governing Body' as a closed list of state-agency boards/commissions, incompatible with the statute's political-subdivision-legislative-body definition used by the same rule's own cited statute (ORS 271.335).

The same rule's restated 'Political Subdivision' definition adds a comma that splits 'dock commission' into two separate qualifying entity types ('dock' and 'commission').

The definitions rule declares it implements ORS 271.335 but contains no operative text that addresses the statutory requirements for waiving and relinquishing reversionary interests, the 20-year threshold, or the public interest determination.

The rule declares implementation of ORS 271.330 (a statute about political subdivisions relinquishing property) but the operative text is purely a definitions rule for state agency property management that never engages with the substantive provisions of ORS 271.330.

Rule 125-090-0138 excludes carpool participants from the Smart Commuter Program incentive while ORS 276.601(3)(b) and (4) contemplate incentive programs for employees participating in carpools and vanpools.

The rule authorizes the Department to operate housing units as rental properties with specific management powers (setting rates, entering leases, charging for repairs, conducting inspections) that go beyond the statute's authorization to acquire and improve land.

The rule excludes stand-alone storage and parking facilities from the definition of 'office quarters,' but the statute does not contain this exclusion.

The rule allows DAS to rescind or refuse parking authorization for any person meeting listed conditions, but fails to exempt statewide elective officers whom the statute mandates receive free parking.

The rule requires agencies to certify legislative funding availability for the current biennium and intent to fund the full lease term, but the statute imposes no such certification requirements on requesting agencies.

The rule allows annual rental rate adjustments based on market conditions, while the statute requires rate-setting on a biennial basis with modifications between sessions only after reporting to the Emergency Board.

The rule declares it implements ORS 276.059, but the operative text (variance decision criteria) does not engage with 276.059's operative requirements (mandatory review process, 90-day deadline, written decision requirement, deemed approval).

Rule 1 states that State Capitol and Supreme Court Building are not subject to DAS space assignment, but the statute does not explicitly exclude these buildings and only requires conformity with DAS-managed buildings, leased quarters, or other agency space as provided by other statutes not included here.

OAR 125-125-0150(2) exempts additional entities (SAIF Corporation, Lottery, Secretary of State, Treasurer's Office, Legislative or Judicial branches) that ORS 276.227(7) does not mention.

Rule 125-060-0005 permits private commercial rental units in the Capitol area, but the statute declares its purpose is to permanently secure the areas from commercial encroachment.

The rule limits project review to capital construction valued at $1,000,000 or greater, but the statute requires the Commission to review all proposals of state agencies to change state buildings.

Rule 125-120-0150 requires public notice to local officials and community groups for significant leases, a requirement not stated in the statute.

The rule omits the 75% direct labor requirement for fiscal years beginning on or before June 30, 2019 that the statute specifies, including only the 65% and 60% thresholds for subsequent periods.

The rule declares it implements ORS 279A.157, but its operative text contains only a cross-reference to another rule and requirements about conflict minerals from SB 471, never engaging with the substance of ORS 279A.157.

Rule 125-246-0555 declares implementation of ORS 279A.159 but does not establish any substantive education and training standards that the statute requires; it only references that Contract Administration is 'subject to the requirements' of the statute.

Rule 125-246-0320 declares it implements ORS 279A.145 but its operative text contains only definitions unrelated to the statute's requirement to include recycled product purchasing information in publications and training programs.

Rule declares it implements ORS 279A.161 (which requires director review and verification of advice, with a signed statement before executing contracts over $150,000, and allows delegation for agencies with 12+ contracts), but the rule's operative text never addresses any of these substantive requirements—it only references another rule and addresses conflict minerals compliance.

OAR 125-246-0322(1) limits the recycled materials preference to only Competitive Sealed Bidding or Competitive Sealed Proposals, but the statute applies the preference requirement to any procurement method without such limitation.

The rule requires contractors to use recycled PETE products in contract performance, a mandate not stated in the statute which only requires providing guidelines and identifying suppliers.

The rule requires certification only for offerors with 50+ employees on contracts exceeding $500,000, but the statute contemplates a program for any person intending to submit a bid or proposal for a public contract without those thresholds.

The rule narrows the sources from which surplus property may be received by excluding not-for-profit organizations, other states, and private entities that the statute explicitly includes.

The rule broadens the definition of property included in surplus property by adding vehicles and titled equipment, which exceeds the statutory definition of 'Property' as personal property.

OAR 125-055-0037 declares it implements ORS 279A.025(4), but that statute only exempts certain procurement methods from applying to qualified nonprofit agency contracts; the rule's operative text establishes affirmative substantive requirements about successor contractors, wages, and health benefits that are not found in the declared statute.

OAR 125-246-0400(2)(c)(C) adds ORS 279B.085 as an alternative for source selection methods, but ORS 279A.215(1)(a) limits acceptable methods to only those 'specified in ORS 279B.055 or 279B.060'

Rule 125-246-0400(2)(c)(C) permits source selection methods equivalent to ORS 279B.055, 279B.060 OR 279B.085, but the statute ORS 279A.220(1)(a) restricts them to 279B.055 or 279B.060 only.

Rule 125-246-0110(102) defines 'Original Contract' to apply to any Department or Authorized Agency contract, but the statute ORS 279A.200(1)(f) limits the definition to contracts in cooperative procurements only.

The rule drops the statutory prohibition on using records for evaluating proposals or invitations to bid.

OAR 125-246-0220(9) uses a $100,000 threshold for Public Improvement Contracts with Emerging Small Businesses, while ORS 279A.100(3) limits the affirmative action preference to contracts estimated to cost $50,000 or less.

The rule makes the statutory mandate to punish violations discretionary by creating an optional administrative process that the statute does not authorize.

Rules 125-055-0100 through 0130 declare they implement ORS 279A.140 (a general state procurement statute about DAS authority and contract procedures) but the operative text is entirely about HIPAA Business Associate requirements, Privacy Rule, Security Rule, and Protected Health Information—subjects that ORS 279A.140 does not address.

Rule oar-125-246-0800 declares it implements ORS 279A.010(x) (which defines 'Proposer') but the operative text never engages with proposers—it discusses selling and leasing activities and procurement methods.

Rule 125-246-0400(2)(b)(F) defines 'Joint Cooperative Procurement' to require only identification of participants and contract requirements, omitting the statutory requirement for an open and impartial competitive process and the requirement for no material changes in terms, conditions or prices.

OAR 125-246-0400 requires delegation of authority for agencies to act as Administrators or Participants in cooperative procurements, a condition not stated in ORS 279A.205

OAR 125-249-0880 declares it implements ORS 279A.030 (federal law prevails) but the operative rule text contains only a cross-reference to another rule, never engaging with the federal law supremacy principle.

The rule's retaliation protection extends to employees who merely witness or report misconduct without requiring they also experience or witness it first, whereas the statute protects only those who (experience or witness) AND report.

The rule defines 'Discrimination' as conduct showing animosity 'to others,' while the statute defines it as conduct that evinces animosity 'in others'—a grammatically and semantically distinct meaning.

Rule 125-247-0165 declares it implements ORS 279B.270 but the operative text addresses electronic goods procurement, environmental impact, and sustainability considerations, not the recycled materials and recovered resources requirements of ORS 279B.270.

Rule 125-247-0170 declares it implements ORS 279B.270 but the operative text establishes life cycle costing as an evaluation methodology for total cost of ownership, not the substantive requirement to use recycled materials and recovered resources stated in ORS 279B.270.

Rule 125-247-0165 narrows the scope of ORS 279B.025 by applying only to electronic goods and only to the Department and Authorized Agencies, whereas the statute applies to all contracting agencies and all goods.

Both rules reference a 'prohibition against revocation' in ORS 279B.120(3) that does not exist; the statute allows revocation but only prohibits it after advertisement has been issued.

Rule section (3) applies only to services contracts, but statute ORS 279B.210 applies to all public contracts and all solicitations for public contracts generally.

Rule uses appearance-based standard (whether reasonable person would believe advantage exists), while statute focuses on actual material competitive advantage.

OAR 125-246-0321(2)(b) expands beyond recycled products already made from recycled materials to include virgin materials 'which may be recycled or reused when discarded,' and omits the statute's required condition that recycled products be 'functionally equal' to virgin products.

Rule 125-247-0690 directs exceptions to the 'State Chief Procurement Officer' while Rule 137-047-0560 directs them to the 'Director of the Department of Administrative Services' (matching the statute's 'Director of the Oregon Department of Administrative Services'), creating conflicting guidance on where agencies must apply for exceptions under ORS 279B.040(2).

Two implementing rules establish conflicting deadlines for filing protests: one requires 7 days prior to Closing, the other requires 10 days prior to Closing.

The rule claims ORS 279B.120(3) contains 'the prohibition against revocation of prequalification,' but the statute text provided (ORS 279B.125(3)) explicitly permits revocation: 'the contracting agency may revoke or may revise and reissue the prequalification after reasonable notice.'

The rule authorizes agencies to verify disclosure information and require contractors to maintain minimum worker levels over the contract term, which the statute does not authorize.

Rule 125-247-0296 declares it implements ORS 279B.140 (which addresses only price agreements) but the rule's operative text broadly applies mandatory use requirements to 'Department Price Agreements, service agreements, and sales agreements' — types of contracts beyond the statute's scope.

The rule expands the definition of 'Special Circumstances' beyond the statute's specific list by adding an independent, broader definition that would cover any circumstance making services 'incapable of being managed, utilized or dealt with successfully'—a standard more general and subjective than the statute's specific examples.

The statute applies to all contracting agencies subject to specified exemptions, but the rule restricts application to state contracting agencies only, excluding local agencies not otherwise exempt.

OAR 125-247-0760 declares it implements ORS 279B.425 but its operative text refers to another rule (OAR 137-047-0745) and makes a statement about the State Chief Procurement Officer without engaging the statute's subject matter of review procedures for prequalification and debarment decisions.

The statute establishes a narrow exception to the seven-day notice requirement when 'seven days is impractical,' but both rules broaden this to allow a shorter notice period whenever 'circumstances justify prompt execution of the Contract,' a much more permissive standard.

OAR 125-247-0265(3) states state agencies "must comply with ORS 200.035" but the statute requires them to document actions AND consider certified businesses, and only for contracts of $10,000 or more.

The rule limits cost analysis requirements to state contracting agencies only, while the statute applies to all contracting agencies and explicitly contemplates both state and local agencies with different reporting requirements.

The rule adds a $250,000 contract value threshold that the statute does not mention, limiting the cost analysis requirement to larger procurements.

The rule narrows the definition of 'Services' by excluding architects, engineers, and client services, categories the statute does not exclude.

The rule limits applicability to solicitations under specific statutes (279B.060, 279B.065, 279B.070, 279B.085, or 279A.200–279A.225), but ORS 279B.215 contains no such limitation and applies generally.

OAR 125-247-0691 sections (4) and (5) impose monetary thresholds ($25,000 and $250,000) and multi-year periods (5 years) requiring additional procedural steps that do not appear in ORS 279B.215.

OAR 125-247-0200(2) establishes a mandatory priority system requiring agencies to consider specific sources (Surplus Property, OFCs, Inmate Labor, OSBEs, Statewide Price Agreements) in priority order before using the methods in ORS 279B.050, but ORS 279B.050 makes no reference to these sources or requires any such priority ranking.

OAR 125-247-0270(2)(e) requires posting on OregonBuys with formal notice procedures, but ORS 279B.070(4) specifies seeking at least three informally solicited quotes, which indicates no formal notice requirement.

Rule adds requirement that bidders must comply with 'any rules and regulations that implement or enforce' tax laws, which the statute does not mention—it specifies only 'tax laws of the state or a political subdivision of the state, including ORS 305.620 and ORS chapters 316, 317 and 318'

The rule declares it implements ORS 279C.412 but contains only a cross-reference to another administrative rule without any operative text that actually engages with the statute.

OAR 125-249-0320 declares it implements ORS 279C.360 but contains only rules about pre-closing modifications and withdrawals, which ORS 279C.360 does not address

The statute requires adoption of procedures to screen and select persons for contracts involving 'architectural, engineering, photogrammetric mapping, transportation planning or land surveying services,' but the rule's licensing requirement in subsection (1)(b) applies only to architects, engineers, and land surveyors, omitting photogrammetric mapping and transportation planning professionals.

OAR 125-249-0800 declares it implements ORS 279C.545 but its operative text consists only of a cross-reference to another rule and does not engage with the statute's specific requirements for posting notices.

OAR 125-248-0130 declares implementation of ORS 279C.307 in its frontmatter, but the operative text (sections 1-2) addresses only selection procedures under ORS 279C.120 and never engages with the substance of ORS 279C.307 (restrictions on procuring oversight services from parties to the contract being overseen).

Rules assert that 'State law requires a narrow interpretation' of official state business, but the statute requires only that activities advance lawful policies without mandating narrow construction

The rule's operative text addresses selling CNG fuel to private entities and the general public, which does not engage with ORS 283.327's statutory requirements governing state agency light-duty vehicle procurement decisions.

The statute permits operation by anyone 18 or older (by prohibiting only those under 18), but the rule requires drivers to be 'over the age of 18 years,' which literally means greater than 18 and would exclude 18-year-olds.

OAR 125-155-0500(1) states that 'personal use...may coincide' with state business use and 'certain allowable activities of a personal nature may occur,' but OAR 125-155-0500(3) states categorically that 'No one has authority to permit any personal or family use of a state vehicle.'

The rule applies the mileage standard to 'light fleet vehicles' while the statute applies it specifically to 'standard passenger vehicle,' expanding the scope of regulated vehicles.

The statute requires agencies to 'shall sell and not replace' non-compliant vehicles, but the rule states vehicles are 'subject to reassignment or sale,' making the requirement discretionary rather than mandatory.

The rule establishes an exemption approval process requiring Fleet Management Advisory Council review and approval, which is not mentioned in the statute's exemption framework.

The rules define 'private or personal vehicle' to include rented, borrowed, and leased vehicles, but the statute specifies only 'privately owned vehicles.'

The rule limits application to 'light fleet vehicles' while the statute applies to any 'standard passenger vehicle owned or assigned to the state agency or institution,' narrowing the statutory scope.

OAR 125-090-0000 declares it implements ORS 283.110, but the operative text establishes definitions for parking facilities and related terms, which does not engage with ORS 283.110's provisions about state agencies furnishing services, facilities and materials to other agencies upon requisition and charging for those services.

OAR 125-090-0002 declares it implements ORS 283.110, but the operative text establishes purpose and authority for parking facility regulation, which does not engage with ORS 283.110's provisions about state agencies furnishing services, facilities and materials to other agencies upon requisition and charging for those services.

OAR 125-180-1060(1) requires the department to distribute funds 'annually' but omits the statute's mandatory time window of 'not sooner than July 10 and not later than July 15.'

OAR 125-180-1020(2) incorrectly cites ORS 285C.600(2) as the source of the 'Eligible Project' definition, but that statute section defines 'Business firm,' not 'Eligible project.' The correct citation should be ORS 285C.600(4).

The rule presents prepaid cards as a standard payment option available to all employees, but the statute only permits bank-issued payroll cards when the department determines electronic payment is not practicable or efficient.

The rules require organizations to be approved and participate in the Annual Charitable Fund Drive before allowing payroll deductions, whereas the statute permits deductions upon individual written request to any foundation without requiring approval or program participation.

The statute specifies a fixed two-year term for committee members, but the rule allows the Director to appoint members to terms ranging from one to three years.

The rule expands violations of anti-trust laws to include monopolization attempts, which are not mentioned in ORS 646.725, which addresses only restraints of trade.

The rule omits 'combine' from the types of prohibited conduct enumerated in the statute.

The rule defines 'Department' as a specific division of ODAS rather than the whole department as the statute states.

The rule limits authorized work assignments to facilities within Oregon operated by Corrections, while the statute does not include these geographic or operational restrictions.

The rule imposes a 6-month time limit on medical services following release, but the statute provides services 'for a period that the nature of the injury or the process of recovery requires' with no specific time limit.

The rule applicability is limited to DOC only, but the statute's definition of 'attending practitioner' includes both Department of Corrections and Oregon Youth Authority medical staff, suggesting coverage was intended for both.

Rule declares it implements ORS 671.530 but its entire operative text is just a cross-reference to another rule, with no engagement with the statute.

OAR 125-300-0200(2) excludes Oregon Health Authority from the boards covered by the rule, but ORS 676.160(18) defines health professional regulatory board to include Oregon Health Authority to the extent it licenses emergency medical services providers.

Rule declares it implements ORS 701.026 but operative text is only a cross-reference that never engages with the statute's requirements about contractor licensing

Rule declares it implements ORS 701.026 but operative text is only a cross-reference that never engages with the statute's requirements about contractor licensing

OAR 125-090-0000(20) redefines 'Parking Facility' more narrowly than ORS 98.805(3) by limiting it to facilities owned, managed, controlled or administered by DAS, whereas the statute defines parking facility as any property used for vehicle parking without such limitation.

Two DOJ child-support rules implementing the same statute define 'substantial compliance' two contradictory ways — a pure time trigger vs. a pure dollar/percentage variance test.

A rule narrows the statutory 'child attending school' definition by adding a military-service exclusion the statute's four-part test doesn't contain.

The same rule collapses the statute's two distinct reinstatement pathways (non-IV-D vs. IV-D cases, with different recipients of confirmation) into one standard, and adds a case-closure precondition the statute doesn't authorize.

A DOJ bingo rule's 'raffle' definition drops the statute's charitable/fraternal/religious-operator requirement and substitutes a rebuttable 'consideration presumption' concept the statute doesn't contain.

OAR 137-065-0200 declares it implements ORS 181A.225, but its operative text addresses victim services (safety planning, trauma-informed practices, qualifying programs) and never engages with the statute's actual subject matter: crime statistics reporting requirements, data collection, quarterly/annual reports, and disclosure rules.

Rule requires petitioner to affirmatively explain why granting stay will not result in substantial public harm; statute puts that determination on the agency, requiring the agency to determine whether substantial public harm will result after the petitioner shows irreparable injury and colorable claim of error.

Rule cites ORS 183.415(7) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(4) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(4) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule text references ORS 183.415(10) but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(9) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(9) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(9) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(6) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(4) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(4) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule cites ORS 183.415(5) in declared statutes, but the statute provided only contains sections (1)-(3).

Rule requires petitioner to include detailed comments on multiple factors when requesting amendment or repeal, while statute only requires agency to consider these factors when reviewing the petition and agency to invite public comment.

The rule makes declaratory rulings binding between intervenors and the agency, but the statute states rulings are binding only between the agency and the petitioner.

The statute requires attorney-issued subpoenas be 'subscribed by the signature of the attorney,' but the rule does not include this signature requirement.

OAR 137-003-0075 permits final orders by default without explicitly requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law, contrary to the statute's mandate that all final orders be accompanied by these.

The rules fail to implement ORS 183.630(4), which restricts ALJ authority to authorize agency-paid depositions. The discovery rules (OAR 137-003-0566, et seq.) list specific discovery methods (witness lists, documents, requests for admission, interrogatories) but do not mention depositions or the statutory prohibition on ALJ authorization of agency-paid depositions.

The statute permits agencies to use arbitration to resolve disputes, but the rule restricts this to non-binding arbitration only.

Rule 137-003-0572 requires petitioner to explain why no other means are adequate, but statute only requires showing materiality

Rule 137-003-0025 requires explanation of why deposition is necessary, but statute only requires showing of materiality and other specified items

OAR 137-003-0015(2) and OAR 137-003-0565(2) contradict each other on who may establish a deadline for the collaborative dispute resolution process in contested cases.

Rule 137-003-0555(1)(b) expands the statutory definition of 'authorized representative' by adding 'or other authorized representatives recognized by state or federal law,' covering categories not enumerated in ORS 183.457(5).

Rule 137-003-0035 addresses prehearing conferences and contains no substantive provisions about ex parte communications, yet declares it implements ORS 183.462 which requires placing ex parte communications on the record and notifying parties of rebuttal rights.

Rule 137-003-0040(8) and rule 137-003-0055 apply ex parte communication requirements to communications 'during the contested case proceeding,' whereas ORS 183.462 limits the requirement to communications 'during its review of a contested case'—a post-hearing period.

Rule 137-003-0055 applies ex parte communication requirements to communications 'during the contested case proceeding,' whereas ORS 183.462 limits the requirement to communications 'during its review of a contested case'—a post-hearing period.

The rule removes a condition from the statute requiring modification notice only when the ALJ will not enter the final order, making the rule apply in more situations than the statute requires.

Rule 137-001-0100(2) permits agencies to review amended rules despite the statute explicitly excluding amendments from the periodic review requirements.

OAR 137-003-0001(1) requires notice to include only 6 items (caption, statement, representation, right to hearing, authority/jurisdiction, and either time/place or procedure/time), but ORS 183.413(2) requires 16 items including identification of issues, discovery, hearing procedure description, recording, attorney for agency, presiding officer function, recess right if unrepresented, adjournment opportunity, opportunity to review findings, appeal process, and active duty servicemembers statement.

OAR 137-003-0505(1) requires notice of proposed sanctions in subsection (i), but ORS 183.413(2) contains no requirement for notice of sanctions in the contested case hearing notice.

OAR 137-001-0007(2) requires only a 'good faith effort' to ensure advisory committee membership represents affected interests, while ORS 183.333(1)(b) mandates that membership 'must represent' such interests.

OAR 137-001-0007(3) requires seeking recommendations on fiscal impact and small business impact only if the committee indicates significant adverse impact, while ORS 183.333(3) requires seeking such recommendations unconditionally whenever an advisory committee is appointed.

OAR 137-001-0087 does not include the 14-day deadline requirement for filing objections to fiscal impact statements that is specified in ORS 183.333(5).

Two rules both declare implementation of ORS 183.430 but contain contradictory provisions on whether combining emergency suspension hearings with related proceedings requires party agreement.

Rule 137-003-0625(2)(e) requires recording of oral responses to any ex parte communication (oral or written), but statute ORS 183.685(1)(e) only requires recording oral responses to ex parte oral communications.

OAR 137-001-0040(4)(g) cites ORS 183.355(1) and (3) as authority for including a filing copy in the rulemaking record, but 183.355(1) addresses Secretary of State prescribing filing requirements, and 183.355(3) addresses when rules become effective—neither requires copies in the rulemaking record.

Rule 137-045-0050 declares it implements ORS 190.490, but the operative text exempts 'Public Contracts' from 'legal sufficiency approval requirement under ORS 291.047' and never addresses intergovernmental agreements under ORS 190.485 or approval requirements under ORS 190.490.

OAR 137-049-0210(3) requires notice to the Advocate for Minority, Women and Emerging Small Business when contract price exceeds $5,000, but ORS 200.035 specifies the threshold is $10,000 or more.

OAR 137-049-0370(1)(b)(B) enumerates three items (i)-(iii) corresponding to ORS 200.075(1)(a)-(c), but omits the fourth prohibited act listed in ORS 200.075(1)(d).

OAR 137-046-0130(3) addresses only local contracting agencies' designation of personal services contracts, omitting the statute's equal provision allowing state contracting agencies to designate personal services contracts.

OAR 137-049-0370 does not include the three-year statute of limitations on disqualification allegations in ORS 279A.110(3), allowing disqualifications beyond the temporal window the statute permits.

OAR 137-046-0470(1) adds an exception for agencies not subject to the Code, making compliance with ORS 279B.400-279B.425 conditional, whereas the statute requires it absolutely.

The rule omits the statutory requirement that a benefit company's majority workforce be located in the state 'at the time the benefit company submits the bid or proposal,' dropping a temporal qualifier.

The rule omits the statutory specification that an employee stock ownership plan must be 'as defined in 26 U.S.C. 4975(e)(7), as in effect on September 26, 2025,' replacing that specific definitional reference with a general IRS recognition standard.

OAR 137-049-0880 declares it implements ORS 279A.030 (federal law prevails) but the operative rule text addresses only records maintenance and audit procedures, never engaging with the federal law supremacy principle.

Rules 137-049-0490 and 731-005-0750 apply the reporting requirement to 'Foreign Contractor' and 'Non-Resident Contractor' respectively, but the statute applies it only to 'nonresident bidder' as statutorily defined—a bidder who meets specific criteria about Oregon tax payments, business address, and bid disclosure.

Rule 137-047-0575(3) adds 'Imputed Knowledge' as a basis for debarment by attributing affiliate conduct to a prospective offeror, which is not listed among the specific enumerated grounds for debarment in ORS 279B.130(2).

Rule 137-047-0575(2) allows contracting agencies to circumvent the three-year debarment limit in ORS 279B.130(1)(b) by making responsibility determinations that exclude previously debarred offerors, effectively creating indefinite disqualification.

The statute makes rejection discretionary ('may be rejected'), but the rule makes certain rejections mandatory ('shall reject') based on specific criteria.

Rule cites ORS 279B.060(6)(d) regarding addenda modifying evaluation criteria for tiers, but ORS 279B.060(6) only contains subsections (a), (b), and (c). The actual statute provision governing addenda that modify criteria before a tier begins is ORS 279B.060(10).

OAR 137-047-0600(3)(a) prohibits negotiation with any bidder, while OAR 170-002-0150(2) authorizes the Treasurer to negotiate contract terms with any offeror following closing; both rules claim to implement ORS 279B.055.

OAR 137-047-0270(3) prohibits contract amendments from exceeding $250,000 or 125% of original price, but ORS 279B.070(1) explicitly allows amendments to exceed $250,000 if done in accordance with rules.

Rule adds requirement that bidders must comply with 'any rules and regulations that implement or enforce' tax laws, which the statute does not mention—it specifies only 'tax laws of the state or a political subdivision of the state, including ORS 305.620 and ORS chapters 316, 317 and 318'

Both OAR 137-049-0810 and OAR 734-010-0420 omit the statutory protection for 'equitable adjustment' alongside damages, narrowing the scope of contractor rights protected from waiver.

OAR 137-049-0290(1) requires bid security to be between 5% and 10%, but the statute allows up to 10% with no stated minimum.

The rule adds mandatory procedures (advertising requirements, protest provisions) for RFQs that the statute permits but does not require.

The rules require the disqualified person to notify the contracting agency of their appeal intent within three business days, but omit the statute's mandatory requirement that the contracting agency then notify the Director of DAS (for state agencies) or the local contract review board (for other agencies).

OAR 137-048-0200(1)(c) and (d) require that the earlier contract be awarded under formal selection procedure, but the statute only requires that it be awarded under rules adopted under ORS 279A.065, which potentially encompasses other procedures.

OAR 137-049-0370(1)(a)(D) narrows the disqualification ground by adding 'material' to 'failure to perform' when the statute requires no such materiality threshold.

OAR 137-049-0240 declares it implements ORS 279C.370 (subcontractor disclosure), but its operative text addresses only pre-offer conferences and never engages with disclosure requirements, subcontractor identification, thresholds, or any other requirement in ORS 279C.370.

OAR 137-049-0470 declares it implements ORS 279C.370 (subcontractor disclosure), but its operative text addresses only substitute prime contractors under performance bonds and never engages with disclosure requirements, subcontractor identification, thresholds, or any other requirement in ORS 279C.370.

Rule section (1) applies to suspensions of work, but the statute covers only 'termination of the contract'—suspension and termination are distinct concepts.

The statute requires delivery to one of three recipients (ODAS Director, local contract review board, or Director of Transportation depending on agency type), but the rule requires delivery only to the 'Contracting Agency's Contract Review Authority,' omitting the ODAS Director option.

The statute requires evaluations to be 'made available for public inspection,' but the rule does not address this public inspection requirement.

OAR 137-049-0210 cites ORS 279C.340 for prequalification requirements, but ORS 279C.360(2)(c) specifies ORS 279C.430

OAR 137-049-0320 declares it implements ORS 279C.360 but contains only rules about pre-closing modifications and withdrawals, which ORS 279C.360 does not address

OAR 137-048-0210(7) creates a $150,000 fee threshold not found in ORS 279C.110, requiring only 3 consultants to be contacted for informal selections under $150,000 versus 5 consultants for amounts from $150,000-$250,000, but the statute contains no such $150,000 breakpoint—only $100,000 and $250,000 thresholds.

Rule 137-048-0270(2) imposes a mandatory minimum of three consultants for Price Agreements when the statute reserves the selection procedures to the contracting agency's sole discretion.

Rule requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before court action, but statute permits immediate judicial action by adversely affected parties.

The rule changes the statute's discretionary 'may' to a mandatory 'shall' for calculating compensation as a percentage of work completed when there is no unit or itemized pricing.

The rule allows retention of unsuccessful bidders' security longer than the statute permits. The statute prohibits retention after the contract is 'duly signed,' but the rule requires return only after 'a Contract has been fully executed and all required bonds and insurance have been provided,' which could occur later.

OAR 137-049-0800 declares it implements ORS 279C.545 but its operative text requires only that 'all of the ORS Chapter 279C required Contract clauses' be included per a referenced checklist, without specifying what those clauses are or addressing the statute's specific requirements for posting notices with boldfaced 12-point type in a prominent place.

Rule (1) omits the statute's exception for third-party judicial proceedings unrelated to labor disputes, narrowing when compensation is due.

Rule OAR 137-049-0630(7) imposes a 7-calendar-day deadline for submitting written requests for a public hearing on exemptions, but ORS 279C.335(5) does not specify any such deadline.

The administrative rules fail to explicitly carve out contractor violations from the compensation entitlements, contrary to the statutory exception in ORS 279C.670.

OAR 731-005-0690 implements a 3 working day waiting period before ODOT's award becomes final, but ORS 279C.375(2) requires notice of intent to award be issued at least 7 days before awarding, and OAR 137-049-0395(3) requires the award not be final until 7 days after notice.

The rule permits limited negotiation with the highest-ranked proposer on statement of work and contract price even when the RFP did not authorize negotiations, but the statute requires that negotiations be 'authorized by the request for proposals.'

OAR 137-049-0820(2)(c) requires contractors to share interest earnings with subcontractors, while ORS 279C.560(5) only provides that earnings accrue to the contractor without imposing a sharing obligation.

The rule extends the definition of 'Guaranteed Maximum Price' to alternative contracting methods beyond CM/GC services, while the statute defines GMP only for CM/GC.

ORS 279C.835 requires notification whenever a contract subject to ORS 279C.800 to 279C.870 is awarded, but the implementing rule OAR 137-049-0360 only addresses disclosure and notification requirements for ITBs exceeding $100,000, potentially narrowing the scope of contracts subject to the notification requirement.

OAR 137-049-0370 declares it implements ORS 279C.450 (the appeal procedure before the Director with 30-day decision deadline, de novo review, cost allocation, and judicial review limits), but the rule's operative text addresses only the disqualification decision at the contracting agency level and sets a 3-business-day appeal filing deadline—never engaging with any substantive requirement of ORS 279C.450.

The statute allows a prequalified person to submit proof of prequalification in lieu of a prequalification application, but the implementing rule only addresses the rebuttable presumption and does not provide for or address this right to substitute proof.

OAR 137-049-0350(2)(c) and OAR 731-005-0620(2)(c) establish substantially different standards for permitting withdrawal of an offer based on errors, though both rules declare they implement the same statute.

The statute requires that procurement documents for CM/GC services must state the contracting agency will conduct the procurement in accordance with model rules, but the implementing rule does not explicitly require or implement this statement requirement.

OAR 137-049-0200's operative text references ORS 279C.375(3)(b), but that statute is not included in the rule's declared statutes to be implemented.

OAR 137-049-0840(4) sets settlement/judgment interest at 'the discount rate' but the statute requires 'two times the discount rate, but not to exceed 30 percent'

OAR 137-049-0630(7) requires written requests for public hearings to be submitted within 7 calendar days of notice publication, and provides that if no timely request is received, the agency is not required to hold a hearing. The statute states the notice 'must state that in response to a written request, the contracting agency or state agency will hold a public hearing' but does not specify a deadline for making requests or provide that the hearing is optional if no timely request is received.

DOJ's contract-review dollar thresholds are roughly double the statute's, and collapse the statute's 3-way category split into 2 categories.

The rule adds 'exchange' as a type of transaction in the Public Contract definition, which the statute does not list.

The rule adds the qualifier 'major' before 'renovation' in the Public Improvement Contract definition, narrowing it to only major renovations when the statute covers all renovations.

ORS 291.047(1) requires AG approval for information technology contracts over $75,000, but OAR 137-045-0030(1)(a) requires approval only for IT contracts over $150,000.

ORS 291.047(2) requires AG approval for public contracts not subject to subsection (1) over $100,000, but OAR 137-045-0030(1)(b) requires approval only for non-IT contracts over $250,000.

ORS 291.047(1) explicitly requires AG approval for personal services contracts and architectural and engineering services contracts over $75,000 as distinct categories, but OAR 137-045-0030 does not separately address these thresholds, treating them as 'other contracts' subject to a $250,000 threshold.

OAR 137-055-5035(2) and (4) require electronic funds transfer based on employer characteristics (employee count, number of income withholding orders, prior failures) without reference to payment amounts, whereas ORS 293.525(1)(a) permits agencies to require payments 'above designated amounts' to be made by electronic funds transfer.

A DOJ tobacco-escrow rule imposes quarterly deposit deadlines (15 days after quarter-end) inside the statute's single annual April-15 deadline — tighter than, but not contradicting, the statutory outer limit; still a real discrepancy for a reader relying on the statute alone.

A DOJ rule cross-references a subsection of ORS 323.806 for inflation-adjusted escrow amounts that doesn't exist — subsection (2) is about importer liability, not per-unit rate adjustment.

A rule and statute cite different closing section numbers (323.806 vs. 323.807) for the same Attorney General enforcement-monitoring authorization.

OAR 137-005-0052 section (p) narrows ORS 36.232(4) by only explicitly allowing confidential mediation communications for research, training, or educational purposes, while the statute also allows disclosure of the disposition of matters referred for mediation and the terms of mediation agreements for these purposes.

The statute ORS 36.230(2) specifies that provisions exempt from disclosure under ORS 192.311 to 192.478 are confidential, but several rules implementing ORS 36.230 cite ORS 192.410 to 192.505 instead, pointing at different statute sections.

The rule narrows the definition of 'Mediator' by omitting the statutory provision that judges conducting case settlement conferences are included as mediators.

ORS 36.228(2) uses 'private person' but some implementing rules use 'private entity' instead, which could be narrower

Different rules use different terminology ('entity' vs 'party') for the same party type in ORS 36.228 scenario

OAR 137-049-0200 declares it implements ORS 468A.720, but its operative text addresses only public contracting solicitation procedures and mentions the asbestos licensing statute only once in passing without implementing any of the statute's actual provisions regarding licensing qualifications, employee certification requirements, grounds for refusal, or application procedures.

[batch 2, 2026-07-23 re-check] A telephonic-seller disclosure rule drops the statute's '12 months' qualifier, leaving the reporting period undefined.

The rule changes 'usually changed' to 'usually charged' in section (4), altering the statutory language.

OAR 137-020-0550 is declared as implementing ORS 646.608(1)(yy), which prohibits operating as a vehicle dealer without a certificate under ORS 822.005, but the rule establishes purchase agreement requirements for manufactured dwelling dealers, a different category of dealer entirely.

The rule narrows the statutory definition of 'Telephonic Seller' by limiting it only to those required to register with the Department of Justice, whereas the statute defines it as any person who causes or attempts a telephone solicitation regardless of registration status.

The statute requires the Department's document to be posted at the telephonic seller's principal business location, but the rule requires it to be posted at each business location.

OAR 137-049-0820(4)(a) requires 1.5% monthly interest on final payment, but ORS 701.420(2) requires 1% per month.

OAR 137-049-0200(1)(c)(U) cites ORS 701.005(2) as describing "construction Work," but ORS 701.005(2) defines "Commercial contractor" (a specific license endorsement type), not construction work generally.

Rule prohibits initiating establishment of parentage or support after age 18, but statute does not restrict by age and contemplates support for school-attending children who may exceed 18.

Rule omits agreement compliance as a contestable basis for subpoena-based license suspension, though statute requires it.

Rule condition requires that obligor has not paid sufficiently during past three months, which is not stated in the statute's grounds for suspension.

Rule expands personal information categories triggering fingerprinting by adding medical information and substituting criminal history for criminal background information

Rule applies to 'tobacco product manufacturers' while statute specifies 'nonparticipating manufacturers'

OAR 123-001-0750 declares implementation of ORS 183.411 but governs representation and legal argument in hearings, not delegation of authority to enter final orders.

OAR 123-200-2200 declares it implements ORS 183.450(7)(b), but the statute contains only subsections (1) through (5).

OAR 123-001-0725(2) requires notice to include only 6 specific items (receipt date, explanation of denial, statutory reference, right to hearing, file designation, instruction on requesting hearing), but ORS 183.413(2) requires 16 items including time and place of hearing, general description of hearing procedure including burdens of proof, identification of issues, discovery provisions, and many others.

ORS 200.055(3) requires DBE denial/decertification appeals to go to USDOT, but oar-123-200-2000 applies contested case hearing procedures to "All Programs" including DBE, removing the statutorily-mandated USDOT appeal route.

The rule redefines 'Disadvantaged Business Enterprise' as federally-defined USDOT standards, whereas the statute defines it by ownership percentage of socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.

The rule narrows the statute's allowance for COBID to determine other disadvantaged groups by restricting it to only those designated by the SBA and 49 CFR Part 26, removing COBID's independent determination authority.

oar-123-200-2210 declares it implements ORS 200.065, but the operative text addresses only CUF (Commercially Useful Function) reviews and related investigations, which do not appear in the statute and relate to a different statute.

The rule adds an exclusion for leased buildings to the definition of 'state building' that does not appear in the statute's list of exclusions.

OAR 123-475-0010(3) allows title to works of art to vest with either the Contracting Agency or the Resident Agency, but the statute limits title to the Contracting Agency only.

OAR 123-006-0045 restricts sole-source procurements to six specific categories (advertising, bond counsel, event speakers, conferences, memberships, trade missions), while the statute allows sole-source procurements for any goods or services meeting the statutory findings of fact without limiting to specific categories.

ORS 280.518's only listed implementing rule was repealed in 2026 but is still presented as a live relationship.

The rule definition of 'Renewable energy resource' omits hydroelectric generating facilities and renewable energy storage devices that the statute explicitly includes.

Rule 123-623-1950(1)(e) permits distributing community service fees to local organizations or programs without taxing authority, but ORS 285C.623(6) limits the required parties to county, city/port, and local taxing districts listed in ORS 198.010 or 198.180.

OAR 123-674-6885 declares it implements ORS 285C.230(2), but the rule's operative text never addresses that provision. ORS 285C.230(2) concerns what the assessor is not responsible for determining; the rule only addresses what zone sponsors may impose and how sponsors enforce such conditions—not the assessor's exemption from responsibility.

Rule oar-123-674-6200(5)(c)(A) makes disqualification automatic/mandatory after 60 days of non-response, but the statute ORS 285C.235(1) gives the assessor discretion ('may disqualify').

OAR 123-623-1900(3) establishes different fee caps based on determination date ($500K-$2.5M for older projects), while ORS 285C.609(4)(b) states the fee 'shall...not exceed $3 million in any year' without date-based distinctions, and ORS 285C.609(5) requires annual inflation adjustments to that $3 million cap.

The statute requires a mandatory 21-day waiting period before an agreement becomes effective following public posting on the sponsor's website, but the rule does not address this timing requirement or how it should be implemented.

OAR 123-674-3100(4)(b)(A) restricts additional qualified property to being placed in service during only the first or second year of the initial exemption, but ORS 285C.225(3)(b) permits additional property schedules for property placed in service up to two years after the first year that qualified property was placed in service.

The rule extends the exemption from the 10-year redesignation restriction to ports, but the statute limits it to county governments only.

Rule 3700 omits the 'more than two years' timing requirement that the statute specifies for when the first renewal statement must be submitted after approval.

Rule 123-656-1400(3) cross-references ORS 285C.306(2)(b) provisions that govern RENZs, not RPRZs, when describing what lands can compose an RPRZ.

Rule disqualifies all hotel/motel/destination resort firms regardless of property use; statute only disqualifies property operated as such.

The rule limits implementation of the 21-day posting requirement to agreements entered into on or after September 24, 2023, while the statute contains no such date limitation and applies to all agreements.

Rule allows business firms to be eligible based on being in a 'priority industry sector' identified by zone sponsor resolution, but the statute limits eligibility to firms providing goods, products or services to businesses or other organizations.

The statute mandates that state and municipal corporations 'shall make' real property available for lease or purchase, but the rule requires only 'reasonable efforts' to make it available, converting a mandatory obligation into a discretionary standard.

OAR 123-662-2000 declares it implements ORS 285C.140, but the operative text addresses only eligibility criteria (ORS 285C.135) and never engages with any authorization-process requirement from ORS 285C.140 (application contents, filing fee, preauthorization conference, approval procedures, amendments, late filing).

The rule applies the 24-month operations-commencement requirement only to firms that applied for preliminary certification on or after July 1, 2011, but the statute applies this requirement to all annual certification applications regardless of when preliminary certification was obtained.

Rule OAR 123-674-6100(5)(b) cites ORS 285C.220(10) for late filing authority, but subsection (10) addresses fee deposits; the operative late filing provision is ORS 285C.220(9).

The rule conditions the zone sponsor's annual reporting obligation on a request, whereas the statute mandates unconditional submission of an annual report.

The rule specifies different triggering events for when confidentiality ends than the statute requires, extending the confidentiality period.

Rule OAR 123-656-2100(2) restricts boundary changes to areas in the same or contiguous county, but the statute allows amendment to include the entire area of a federal enterprise zone without such geographic restriction.

OAR 123-690-4400 requires a location to be 'effectively farther than 10.4 miles' from I-5 (meaning 10.5+ miles when rounded), while ORS 285C.412(3)(b) requires only '10 or more miles'—narrowing the statute by raising the effective threshold.

OAR 123-690-4600 limits the 130% compensation requirement for qualified rural counties to exemptions beginning in 2018 or later, while ORS 285C.412(1)(c) imposes no such year limitation—narrowing the statute by excluding rural-county facilities certified before 2018.

OAR 123-650-4200(3) provides six alternative criteria for demonstrating zone designation eligibility (economic transition, vacant land, strategy alignment, emerging industries, performance metrics, community-defined indicators) that do not match and are broader than the three specific criteria the statute establishes in ORS 285C.090(1): income levels, unemployment rate, or OBDD's case-by-case economic hardship determination.

Rules 1400(6) and 1525(1) require completed local approval and a locally endorsed SIZ agreement before or with an application to the Department, but ORS 285C.626(1) only requires the firm to 'apply to the Oregon Business Development Department' with 'information required by the department,' without conditioning the application on prior local approval.

OAR 123-674-4200 declares it implements ORS 285C.210 but its operative text engages only ORS 285C.200, and the rule's subject—preventing firm qualification based on job losses elsewhere—does not address ORS 285C.210's subject of defining substantial curtailment of operations.

Two rules implementing the same statute specify different waiting periods before designation documentation can be submitted: 45 days for enterprise zones under rule 123-650-4000, but 31 days for electronic commerce zones under rule 123-662-1000, despite ORS 285C.078 applying the same process to both.

One rule states the preliminary certification application must include a $500 fee; another rule states the Department may excuse or reduce the fee.

Rule OAR 123-674-4300(3)(b)(B) requires firm to dedicate 'at least equal to 25 percent' of property tax savings, while statute ORS 285C.205(3) requires deposit of an amount 'equal to 25 percent' of estimated tax savings.

OAR 123-674-0700(3)(a) allows written agreements to specify abatement periods of up to ten consecutive years, exceeding the five-year statutory maximum (three base years plus two additional years) set by ORS 285C.175(2)(a)(B).

Rule OAR 123-656-1600(2)(a) applies a stricter standard for previously existing facilities on the Tribe's reservation by requiring operations be 'not in any way the continuation,' whereas ORS 285C.300(2)(c)(A) permits facilities as long as the enterprise is not 'the same or substantially identical'—the rule narrows the condition.

The rule for application reconsideration omits the statutory requirement that a denied application after reconsideration must be resubmitted in full with a new submission date.

The rule significantly expands the required contents of item (f) to include a detailed qualified low-income community investment certification form with specific information requirements and a mandatory 20-day prior notice, which the statute does not require.

OAR 123-674-0700(3)(a) allows written agreements specifying abatement periods of 'four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten consecutive years,' which exceeds the two additional years maximum the statute specifies.

Both rules declare implementation of ORS 285C.200, but ORS 285C.125(1) limits rule-making authority to a specific list of statutes that excludes 285C.200.

Both rules declare implementation of ORS 285C.200, but ORS 285C.125(1) limits rule-making authority to a specific list of statutes that excludes 285C.200.

OAR 123-668-1100(3) requires sponsors to submit a report within six months following termination, but ORS 285C.105(1)(k) limits reporting to situations where the county assessor or Department requests it.

OAR 123-690-5000(6)(c) allows exemption from disqualification when employment falls below minimum due to 'unforeseen coincidence of vacant positions...quit,' but the statute limits the exception to decreases caused by 'circumstances beyond the control of the business firm,' and employee quits are generally within a firm's control.

The rule requires consent from 'all existing cosponsors' but the statute requires consent only from 'the existing zone sponsor' (singular).

The rule imposes a specific numeric threshold (-1 or less) for negative net migration where the statute only requires that the county 'has experienced a negative net migration' without specifying a minimum magnitude.

Rule 123-623-1300 states that applicants are 'encouraged' to consider local hiring, while Rule 123-623-1500 requires applicants to 'Address the exhortation' as a mandatory commitment in their application.

The rule treats violations outside the enterprise zone as potentially material for compliance purposes if they benefit zone operations or represent firm-wide activities influencing the zone, whereas the statute limits the compliance requirement to 'laws applicable to the firm's operations inside the enterprise zone.'

Rule 1000(3) states a revoked zone's enterprise zone designation is permanently ineligible for E-commerce status, but rule 1000(7) permits re-designation as E-commerce when that same enterprise zone is later re-designated, directly contradicting the permanent ineligibility established in (3).

Both rules declare they implement ORS 285C.045, which is solely a short-title provision that does not govern or authorize any substantive subject matter that the rules address.

ORS 285C.120(2) requires the Director to 'shall grant' waivers if statutory conditions are met, but OAR 123-650-1100(4) states the Director 'may waive,' making mandatory statutory grant discretionary.

OAR 123-630-0100 declares it implements ORS 285C.656, which specifies three independent recapture scenarios, but the rule only addresses one scenario (the 85% investment requirement), completely omitting the federal recapture scenario and the redemption/repayment scenario.

OAR 123-668-0100(1) defines 'Sponsor' by reference only to designations 'under ORS 285C.065 or 285C.250' and boundary changes 'under ORS 285C.115,' omitting historical sponsors who 'received approval of an enterprise zone under ORS 284.150 and 284.160 (1987 Replacement Part), under ORS 285C.080 before October 5, 2015, or under ORS 285C.085' per the statute, and also omitting 'a port that joined the enterprise zone under ORS 285C.068' mentioned in ORS 285C.050(20)(d).

OAR 123-662-1000 declares it implements ORS 285C.102 but only addresses enterprise zone sponsors, not cities, even though the statute explicitly requires documentation submission from both 'the sponsor of an enterprise zone or the governing body of a city.'

OAR 123-662-1000(4)(c) makes submission discretionary ('may submit') where the statute requires it mandatory ('shall submit').

The rule allows the effective date of a boundary change to be set at the Department's receipt of a complete resubmission when the Department deems revisions significant, but the statute only allows the effective date to be either the date the latest resolution was adopted or the date an outstanding boundary change requirement is satisfied.

The statute mandates that the school support fee rate 'shall' be 'at least 15 percent and not more than 30 percent,' but the implementing rules require only evidence of 'establishment' of a rate without stating this numeric threshold.

The statute requires consultation with 'all local taxing districts,' but the rule excludes notice to taxing districts that have 'the same board or governing body as a Sponsoring Government,' adding an exception the statute does not contain.

Rule narrows the definition of renewable energy by requiring electricity generation, when the statute explicitly includes liquid, gaseous, or solid fuel for commercial sale as renewable energy.

The rule describes the sponsor of a rural renewable energy development zone as potentially being 'multiple counties,' but the statute specifies that when two or more counties apply jointly, only the identified county serves as sponsor.

Rule excludes all self-propelled machinery from exemption regardless of use, but statute allows property used exclusively in tangible goods production to qualify with only a $1,000 minimum cost, without explicitly excluding self-propelled devices.

OAR 123-623-2000 declares implementation of ORS 285C.615, but the operative text addresses confidentiality of Applications and pre-approval communications, not annual reports and their disclosure as the statute requires.

The rule requires the agreement to stipulate a rate for the school support fee, but the statute specifies the amount shall equal the rate set under a different statute (ORS 285C.067), not a rate stipulated in the agreement.

OAR 123-650-4600(1)(a) requires only 25% of land added in a boundary change to be 'usable land' with required infrastructure and zoning characteristics, whereas ORS 285C.115(2)(a) requires that added land shall be 'zoned for use by eligible business firms that has or will have infrastructure facilities, road access, on-site water, on-site sewage disposal and necessary utility services'—allowing the rule to permit up to 75% of additions to lack these statutory characteristics.

Two rules specify conflicting end dates for the First Source Hiring Agreement required by ORS 285C.606(6)(a) for Strategic Investment Program projects: one rule requires the agreement to end when the property tax exemption period concludes on December 31, while another rule requires it to end no sooner than June 30 of the final tax year.

OAR 123-674-7730(2) allows director waivers for late agreement execution based on grounds (such as mistaken communications or inability to obtain agreement through no fault of the firm) that are not within the two grounds specified in ORS 285C.215(3) for waiving requirements.

ORS 285C.215(2)(a) requires that if a firm has not entered into an agreement 'as of April 1 preceding the first tax year,' the sponsor shall inform the county assessor; however, the implementing rules do not explicitly reference or implement this April 1 deadline.

ORS 285C.155(2) requires conditions be established 'at the time authorization is sought,' but oar-123-668-2400(4) states that for non-urban zones, a policy 'does not need to be prospectively adopted' and 'may reflect the cumulative effect of the sponsor's relevant past actions.'

Rule requires the written agreement to stipulate a rate for the school support fee, but the statute specifies that the fee amount is calculated using a rate set under ORS 285C.067(1)(b) without requiring that rate to be stipulated in the agreement itself.

The rule inverts the fee structure: statute establishes $10,000 as base with $5,000 for rural areas; rule establishes $5,000 as base with $10,000 for urban projects. Same inversion applies to both fees.

Rule 123-674-5300(5)(g) requires property be placed back into service "no more than 12 months before the first exemption year," but the statute only requires the 18-month idleness period to precede the first assessment year without specifying when service resumes.

The rule requires application before 'any physical work' on exempt property, while the statute specifies application must occur before 'commencement of construction or installation,' which is narrower.

Rule defines 'business firm' directly instead of deferring to ORS 285C.050 as the statute instructs.

Rule adds requirement that facility operations must directly benefit a traded sector industry, which does not appear in the statute's definition of 'qualified location.'

OAR 123-623-1100(9) narrows the statutory definition of 'Strategic investment zone' by limiting it to 'three existing' zones established before a specific date, whereas the statute allows for any geographic area established under ORS 285C.623.

OAR 123-674-6880(7)(b) applies the April 1 employment requirement deadline to all suspended firms, but the statute limits this deadline to firms that received at least one year of exemption before suspension began.

Rule restricts RENZ redesignation to specific timeframes, contradicting statute's "at any time" language

Rule requires new RPRZ agreement rather than redesignation, narrowing statute's "may be redesignated at any time" standard

Rule OAR 123-656-1000(6)(B) restricts hotel, motel, and destination resort businesses from exemption eligibility for RENZs and RPRZs, a categorical exclusion not stated in the statute.

OAR 123-630-0050(1)(f) allows the information about proposed use of proceeds to be submitted after the initial application (at least 20 days prior to making the investment), whereas the statute ORS 285C.650(1) requires this information to be included in the application that must be submitted.

The rule declares it implements ORS 286A.772, which mandates the Department of Administrative Services include bond-related costs in the Governor's budget, but the operative text never addresses this requirement and instead focuses entirely on Infrastructure Finance Authority grant programs.

oar-812-001-0130 declares it implements ORS 183.460 but the operative text addresses only the disposal of large objects submitted as hearing exhibits after 90 days; it never engages with the statute's requirement that proposed orders be served and parties afforded opportunity to file exceptions.

OAR 812-001-0110 delegates authority to the 'Construction Contractors Board Administrator' (a position/title) rather than to a named individual as required by the statute.

Rule oar-812-001-0030 declares it implements ORS 244.040 but its operative text only states that the Construction Contractors Board adopts an external ethics policy, without containing any substantive provisions that engage with ORS 244.040.

The rule declares it implements ORS 279C.555 (which requires withholding of retainage to be in accordance with ORS 701.420), but the rule's operative text only defines the term 'Subcontractor' and never engages with requirements for withholding retainage.

Rule declares it implements ORS 646.605, but the statute contains no definition or discussion of structures, and the rule's operative text only references ORS 701.005.

Rule 812-002-0760 declares it implements ORS 671.710, which concerns priority of claim payments from surety bonds, but the rule's operative text addresses only what work qualifies as contractor work and never engages with claims, bonds, payment priority, or any other provision of ORS 671.710.

The statute defines 'specialized education program' broadly to include programs from accredited colleges with 2-4 year degrees and apprenticeships, but the rules restrict implementation to only lead-based paint and lead safe work practices training.

Rule extends notification requirement to individuals and persons who are not contractors, when statute requires only "contractors" to notify the board.

Rule extends notification requirement to certified home inspectors when statute requires only "contractors" to notify the board.

Rule extends notification requirement to certified locksmiths when statute requires only "contractors" to notify the board.

Rule adds requirement that parties notify the board of email address changes and attorney changes, which the statute does not require.

Rule adds timing condition that forwarding addresses are not effective until entered into agency records or 7 calendar days pass, a requirement not stated in the statute.

The rule applies the 701.227 disqualification list to violations of ORS 279C.590 (subcontractor disclosure requirements), but the statute 701.227 limits placement on the list to two scenarios: contractors who failed to pay suppliers within 60 days, or persons who supplied false/bad faith information about non-payment.

OAR 812-030-0240(1) states a certified locksmith must either work for a licensed contractor or 'be otherwise exempt under ORS 701.490,' but ORS 701.490 provides exemptions from certification itself, making it logically impossible for a person to be simultaneously certified and exempt from the requirement to be certified.

The rule requires documentation of key employee experience only for licenses obtained pursuant to Oregon Laws 2018, but the statute requires certification of key employee experience for all commercial general contractors and commercial specialty contractors upon license application or renewal.

Rule 812-022-0028(7)-(9) deems certain courses automatically approved without the board considering course content, which the statute requires the board to do for all courses.

OAR 812-005-0800(16) penalizes failure to comply with ORS chapters 316, 656, or 657, but ORS 701.106(1)(b) includes violations of both 'ORS chapter 316 or 317' among the sanctionable offenses, leaving chapter 317 unaddressed by the rule.

OAR 812-001-0100 declares ORS 701.235 as implemented but its operative text about notice procedures for rulemaking does not engage with any substantive requirement of ORS 701.235 (which mandates rules about bonds, complaint processing, direct contractual relationships, and forms).

OAR 812-001-0110 declares ORS 701.235 as implemented but its operative text about temporary rule procedures does not engage with any substantive requirement of ORS 701.235 (which mandates rules about bonds, complaint processing, direct contractual relationships, and forms).

OAR 812-001-0160 declares ORS 701.235 as implemented but its operative text about charges for records and certifications does not engage with any requirement of ORS 701.235 (which mandates rules about bonds, complaint processing, direct contractual relationships, and forms).

Rule 812-002-0540 expands the definition of 'owner of a structure' to include persons who lease or rent structures, but ORS 701.225(3) requires notice be served on 'the owner of each structure' without mentioning lessees or renters as recipients.

OAR 812-030-0110 is a rule about locksmith certification fitness standards, but it declares it implements ORS 701.102, which is a statute exclusively about construction contractor licensing and sanctions, not locksmith licensing.

Rules implementing renewal requirements omit the education completion evidence that the statute requires.

Rule 812-002-0040 declares it implements ORS 701.325, but its operative text only defines a term ('Appurtenance') that appears once in that statute, without engaging the statute's substantive requirements about licensing, permits, information notices, or business licenses.

Rule 812-025-0020(6) requires contractors to pay 180% of state minimum wage for all EEAST program projects, extending wage requirements to non-commercial structures, while the statute only mandates prevailing wage for commercial structures and leaves non-commercial structure wage standards to discretionary consultation with BOLI.

The statute requires the appeal committee to hear appeals on three types of matters (proposed orders, petitions for reconsideration and rehearing, and motions for stays), but the implementing rules only address exceptions to proposed orders from enforcement hearings, omitting procedures for the other two types of appeals the statute mandates.

Rule OAR 812-003-0250 expands the nonexempt class to include joint ventures and trusts, which are not listed in ORS 701.035(2)(a) as entities that must be classified as nonexempt.

The rule applies a $150 minimum threshold to complaints by contractors and subcontractors, but the statute only authorizes the board to set a minimum for material/equipment supplier complaints.

Rule 812-025-0035 implements ORS 701.119(2) but omits the mandatory hearing requirement before revoking certification.

ORS 701.330(4) requires rules specifying both 'time and manner' of delivery of consumer notices, but OAR 812-012-0130 specifies only the time (on or before contract date), omitting the required 'manner' specification.

OAR 812-004-1250 declares in its statutes_implemented line that it implements ORS 701.146, but OAR 812-004-1001(2) specifies which rules apply to ORS 701.146 complaints and does not list OAR 812-004-1250 among them (it lists 1001-1240, then 1260-1320, leaving 1250 out).

OAR 812-002-0260 claims to address ORS 701.098(4)(a)(D), but that provision covers worker leasing company usage, not dishonest/fraudulent conduct; the correct provision is (4)(a)(E).

Rules 812-007-0031, 812-008-0077, 812-025-0032, and 812-030-0223 declare they implement ORS 701.238 and set fees ($10 for replacement cards), but ORS 701.238 authorizes only fees for 'applications under ORS 701.056 for the issuance or renewal of contractor licenses,' not replacement fees.

Rule 812-002-0160 declares it implements ORS 701.238 but its operative text only defines the term 'construction management' and makes no reference to application fees, the subject of ORS 701.238.

OAR 812-032-0123(5) authorizes a $10 fee to replace a certificate and pocket card, but the statute lists only three permissible fees (application, issuance, and renewal) and does not authorize a replacement fee.

OAR 812-030-0250 declares it implements ORS 701.480, but the operative text (which sets application, testing, and certification renewal fees) never engages ORS 701.480 at all—the rule only addresses fee-setting related to certification.

The rule omits the requirement to report changes in responsible managing individuals, which the statute explicitly requires to be reported.

ORS 701.131(1) requires continuous licensing while performing work, but OAR 812-004-1320(3)(a) accepts complaints against respondents licensed only 'during all or part of the work period'

Rule 812-003-0420 changes the deadline for delivering the subcontractor list from 'within 72 hours after a board request' under the statute to 'on the same date that the initial Payroll and Certified Statement form (WH-38) is due' for Davis Bacon projects.

The statute allows moneys to be used for 'lead poisoning prevention, including consumer and industry outreach, public education and other activities,' but the rule specifies only 'lead poisoning prevention, including consumer and industry outreach, public education, and enforcement activities,' replacing the broader 'other activities' with the specific 'enforcement activities.'

OAR 812-006-0100(2) requires all contractor applicants to designate an RMI, but ORS 701.091(2) explicitly exempts businesses licensed solely with residential or commercial developer endorsements from the RMI requirement, and the rule does not acknowledge this exemption.

oar-812-022-0022 declares it implements ORS 701.265, but the statute specifically requires rules establishing minimum standards for approved providers and approved courses, while the rule's operative text addresses only exemptions from CE requirements based on experience—a subject ORS 701.265 does not mention.

The rule establishes a $10 fee for replacement certificate and pocket cards, a fee type not mentioned or capped in the statute's specific enumeration of application, testing, issuance, and renewal fees.

OAR 812-003-0200(1) requires certification of insurance for applicants seeking 'licensure, renewal, reinstatement or reissuance,' but ORS 701.073(2) specifies the requirement applies only 'at the time of licensure and renewal,' not reinstatement or reissuance.

The rule lists specific items that certification 'will include' but omits the professional credentials that the statute requires shall be included in status information.

Rule 812-004-1600(4)(a) determines bond payment eligibility by checking only if the bond was cancelled more than 14 months before complaint receipt, but the statute requires checking the earlier of two dates: the license expiration/cancellation date OR the bond cancellation date.

The rule allows courses in 'Energy' but the statute specifies 'Energy efficiency,' broadening the acceptable subject matter.

Statute mandates board shall attempt to conduct mediation meetings; rule makes meeting scheduling discretionary.

Two rules establish overlapping penalties for contract violations: section (12) penalizes 'failing to use a written contract as required by ORS 701.305' at $500/$1,000/$5,000, while section (37) penalizes 'failing to provide a written contract with the contractual terms provided by ORS 701.305 or OAR 812-012-0110' at $200/$500/$1,000. Both appear to address the same statutory violation (lack of a properly formed contract under ORS 701.305), but with different penalties and unclear scope overlap.

OAR 812-007-0205 requires that lead abatement and inspection contractors have at least one owner or employee who is a licensed lead supervisor or inspector, but ORS 701.510 contains no such requirement for "a lead-based paint activities contractor."

The rule's operative text only defines 'small commercial structure' by reference to ORS 701.005, but does not address any of the substantive provisions in ORS 701.153 regarding recording orders as liens, surety bond payment priorities, payment caps, or complaint procedures that the statute establishes.

Rule 812-003-0240(7) cites the wrong subsection for the independent contractor certification requirement.

Rule 812-003-0410 restricts the Social Security number requirement to sole proprietorships, but the statute requires it for all entity types including partnerships, LLCs, and corporations.

The rule declares it implements ORS 701.083, which concerns specialized education programs as substitutes for continuing education, but the rule's operative text addresses only exemptions from continuing education and never mentions or implements the specialized education program provisions of ORS 701.083.

The rule applies quorum and voting requirements to advisory committees, but the statute only specifies these requirements for the Board itself.

Rule broadens 'Accredited training program' to include EPA and EPA-authorized programs; statute limits to Oregon Health Authority only.

Rule narrows 'Abatement' by dropping reference to P.L. 102-550, section 1004 and omitting requirement that term be further defined pursuant to ORS 431A.350.

The statute requires the maintenance schedule be provided at the time of warranty offer; the rule allows up to 60 days after substantial completion or occupancy.

Rule 812-005-0800 does not provide the mandatory escalating penalties that ORS 701.992(4) explicitly requires for violations of ORS 701.098(1)(k)

Rule 812-012-0170 uses 'order awarding arbitration' instead of the statute's defined term 'court order that confirms an arbitration award,' referring to different concepts.

Rule 812-003-0280 allows letter of credit or cash deposit as alternatives to satisfy renewal requirements, but ORS 701.068(1) requires applicants for renewal to file 'a surety bond' specifically, with no mention of alternatives; ORS 701.088 (not declared as implemented by this rule) provides for such alternatives.

The rule provides definitions for 'Certificate,' 'Conviction,' 'False statement,' and 'License' that do not appear in the statute's definitions section ORS 701.475, which only defines 'Key,' 'Lock,' and 'Locksmith.'

Rule 812-003-0131(5) requires 'at least one owner or employee' to be a certified locksmith, but statute 701.081(5)(c) specifically requires the 'responsible managing individual for the business' to be certified.

Rule 812-003-0131(6) requires 'at least one owner or employee' to be a certified home inspector, but statute 701.081(6)(c) specifically requires the 'responsible managing individual for the business' to be certified.

The statute requires that if the board adopts fee rules under ORS 701.133(3), the rules must provide that a prevailing complainant recover processing fees, but oar-812-004-1110 does not provide for recovery by prevailing complainants.

The statute requires pre-complaint notice be sent by certified mail, but the rule allows either certified or registered mail receipt as proof of compliance.

Rule 812-002-0120 narrows the exemption for casual, minor, inconsequential work by adding requirements not in the statute: that work not require a permit and not be done as a subcontractor.

Rule (34) narrows the statutory violation by restricting it to preclusion (complete prevention) rather than any limitation, and to homeowners rather than any person.

The rule excludes 40 CFR §745.226 from adoption, but the statute requires the licensing system to include the requirements described in that regulation.

The rule allows the requirement to be satisfied by someone who owns the licensee, but the statute specifies the requirement must be met by an employee of the applicant.

The rule's operative text defines 'small commercial structure' by reference to ORS 701.005 only and does not engage at all with ORS 701.153, yet declares it implements that statute.

Rule 812-032-0000 declares implementation of ORS 701.527–701.536 (the statute that defines 'Home energy assessor' and 'Home energy performance score'), but the operative text defines 'Certificate' and 'License' instead, which do not appear in the statute and are not defined or required by ORS 701.527.

OAR 150-316-0241 and OAR 812-003-0240 list different organizational names for the same entity in their cooperation clauses

OAR 150-670-0010 and OAR 436-170-0300 use 'licensed' while OAR 812-003-0240 uses 'registered' to describe the same professional category under ORS 671.010-671.220

OAR 150-670-0010 and OAR 436-170-0300 refer to 'Landscaping businesses' while OAR 812-003-0240 refers to 'Landscape contracting businesses' for the same statutory provision

Rule 459-011-0050(7) adds a condition for purchasing credit under ORS 238.125 that the statute does not contain: requiring restoration of membership rights if the member previously withdrew.

The rule narrows when alternate payees may commence receiving payments by omitting the statute's alternative trigger for commencement upon member's death, disability, or termination of employment before retirement eligibility.

The rule establishes tiered administrative fees based on estimated costs as a percentage of a threshold, while the statute requires charging for actual and reasonable administrative expenses incurred, with only a maximum cap.

The rule definition of 'alternate payee' includes dissolution of registered domestic partnership, which is not explicitly stated in the statute's enumeration of qualifying judgments.

The statute establishes that eligible employees 'shall receive retirement credit' automatically upon meeting specified conditions and returning within required timeframes, but the implementing rule requires submission of an application and payment of a purchase cost as prerequisites to obtaining that credit.

The rule applies the service retirement benefit comparison to all members eligible for service retirement, while the statute limits this comparison only to members who have passed earliest service retirement age.

The rule omits the statutory requirement that interest only applies to underpayments of $10 or more per month, potentially broadening application to all underpayments.

Rule 459-009-0350 declares implementation of ORS 238.705 but its operative text about allocating actuarial assets and liabilities in employee transfers and employer dissolutions never engages with 238.705's actual provisions regarding remitting contributions, charging interest on delinquent contributions, or penalties for delinquent reporting.

OAR 459-035-0040(1)(a) restricts eligible retired state employees to 'Tier One or Tier Two' members, but ORS 238.415(1)(b)(A) defines the category as any 'retired member of the Public Employees Retirement System' meeting other criteria without any tier restriction.

The rule allows PERS to set a deadline for adjusted purchase costs, making the statutory 90-day requirement discretionary.

The rule permits termination for return-to-work violations and refusal to re-retire, circumstances not mentioned in the statute, which limits termination authority to situations where participation would cause loss of tax-qualified status.

The rules limit application to judge members, but ORS 238.250 requires regular accounts for each active and inactive member who made contributions to the fund.

The rules limit application to judge members, but ORS 238.250 requires regular accounts for each active and inactive member who made contributions to the fund.

The rules limit application to judge members, but ORS 238.250 requires regular accounts for each active and inactive member who made contributions to the fund.

Rule oar-459-005-0055 declares it implements ORS 238.607, but the operative text contains no reference to or engagement with that statute.

The rule imposes a specific 80% adequacy standard for substitute annuities, but the statute gives employers discretion to deem the annuity adequate without specifying a particular standard.

The rule allows officers to be deemed to have elected PERS membership through payment of contributions for more than one pay period, making the statute's requirement of written notice within 30 days optional.

The statute mandates that the board 'shall require medical examinations for all applicants,' but the rule states PERS is not obligated to request any examination.

OAR 459-007-0050 declares it implements ORS 238.435, which applies only to persons establishing membership on or after January 1, 1996 (Tier Two), but the rule itself applies exclusively to Tier One active or inactive members (pre-1996).

OAR 459-007-0110 declares it implements ORS 238.435, which applies only to persons establishing membership on or after January 1, 1996 (Tier Two), but the rule itself applies exclusively to Tier One members.

The rule requires submission of 'the full purchase cost' within the time period established in the statute, but ORS 238.165(4) establishes two separate time periods: one year to give written notice of election, and then five years from the date of election to complete payment.

Rule restricts the conversion right under ORS 238.305(6) by requiring that beneficiaries must have been married on the member's effective retirement date, whereas the statute requires only that the beneficiary be the spouse at the time the marriage terminates (without specifying they must have been married at retirement).

Rule requires the 60-day window for changing beneficiary/option to run from 'the date of the first actual (not estimated) benefit payment,' but the statute triggers it from 'the date of the first benefit payment' without distinguishing between estimated and actual payments.

Rules 459-013-0310 and 459-013-0320 make residency a determinative factor in the increased benefits provided under ORS 238.366, but the statute bases the increase solely on years of creditable service with no residency requirement or reference.

OAR 459-005-0055(2) cites ORS 238.630(3)(g) for authority to require actuarial equivalency studies, but that subsection addresses federal tax qualification, not actuarial equivalency, which is governed by ORS 238.630(3)(f).

Rule extends temporary exemption from hour limitations through calendar year 2035, but statute limits it through calendar year 2034.

Rule 459-040-0040(4) specifies that the five-year pro tem service period starts from 'the judge member's retirement date,' but the statute provides an alternative commencement date.

Rule defines 'bona fide retirement' using 'at least six full calendar months' as the threshold, while the statute requires 'more than six consecutive calendar months' for reemployment eligibility.

Rule oar-459-013-0320 declares it implements ORS 238.465, which is outside the scope of ORS 238.384's grant of authority to make rules for 'administration of ORS 238.372 to 238.384.'

The rule establishes a minimum threshold ($5) for retroactive payments, but ORS 238.601 is a legislative findings and intent section addressing fiduciary duties and system administration principles that never engages with the subject of retroactive payments or minimum payment amounts.

OAR 459-007-0080 explicitly references receiving single payment benefits under ORS 238.315 but does not implement the statute's requirement that the member's 'total service retirement allowance... is less than $200 per month,' thereby dropping a condition that determines eligibility for 238.315 treatment.

OAR 459-009-0090 declares it implements ORS 238.225-238.229, but those statutes address only lump-sum payments applied to existing liabilities (ORS 238.229(2): 'the account shall be used to offset contributions to the system that the public employer would otherwise be required to make for the liabilities against which the lump sum payment is applied'). OAR 459-009-0090 establishes an entirely different program for employers with NO existing unfunded actuarial liability to create actuarial surplus, which the statute's operative text never engages.

The rule adds a requirement that the employee must reenter 'in a qualifying position' when the statute only requires reentering 'the service of an employer participating in the system'

ORS 238.430(3) excludes judge members from ORS 238.435, but the rules declare they implement both ORS 238.430 and ORS 238.435 without explicitly excluding judge members from the earnings crediting procedures, potentially extending ORS 238.435 benefits to judge members contrary to the statute's limitation.

Rules 0400, 0410, and 0420 declare they implement ORS 238.255 but their operative text never engages with 238.255's core requirements regarding reserve accounts, assumed interest rate comparisons, or deficit rules—they only address judge member-specific earnings crediting procedures.

The rule restricts protection to only 'authorized paid leave' with a 600-hour threshold, while the statute protects all 'leave of absence, sabbatical leave, illness, accident or emergency' without such conditions.

Rule 459-016-0100(3)(a) allows lump-sum unit purchases for members retiring up to age 65 if prior contributions were made, but the statute limits lump-sum purchases to those retiring prior to age 60.

Both rules declare they implement ORS 238.750, which is a short title provision containing no substantive requirements about transmission of documents, information, reports, or remittances that the rules actually address.

Rule requires trustee-to-trustee transfers to be received by PERS within time periods established in underlying eligibility statutes, but the statute does not explicitly impose a deadline for receiving transfers—only that the member must be eligible.

Rule allows additional trustee-to-trustee transfers when costs are adjusted upward, but the statute requires the member to pay any remaining amount needed.

The rule redefines 'delayed' benefit as occurring when valid request for distribution is received more than one year after death, whereas the statute defines 'delayed' as when the member's spouse elects to delay payment.

Rule OAR 459-005-0100 broadens the definition of 'member' beyond what the statute defines to include beneficiaries of PERS members and alternate payees, when the statute defines member only as persons who have established membership in the system.

Rule section (6) adds a new ground for ineligibility to restore credit under ORS 238.115 based on termination status under ORS 238.095(2), a condition not stated in the statute.

Both rules are declared to implement ORS 238.364 but their operative text never engages with any of its substantive provisions (calculation formulas, service cutoffs, alternate payee division rules, etc.) and instead implement residency requirements entirely absent from ORS 238.364.

The rule restricts authorized investments to those "enhancing the value of the PERF," but the statute only says it will not impair any law authorizing investment of moneys from the fund, without requiring such investments to enhance value.

The rule introduces residency as a determinative factor for calculating increased benefits, but ORS 238.368 contains no residency requirement and specifies increases based only on years of creditable service and job category at retirement.

The rule adds an age requirement (under 72) for becoming a judge member that the statute's definition does not contain.

The rules extend eligibility to 'dependent domestic partner,' a category not mentioned in the statute's definition of eligible persons.

OAR 459-013-0110 states that membership will not terminate under ORS 238.095(2) if a member reaches earliest retirement age, but ORS 238.095(2) establishes automatic termination based solely on inactive period and vesting status, with no exception for members reaching retirement age.

Rule 459-007-0370 declares it implements ORS 238.265, but the operative text governs EPSA withdrawal under ORS 238A.375, not member account withdrawal under ORS 238.265; ORS 238.265 excludes the rule's own subject matter.

OAR 459-013-0110 describes members as 'becomes eligible for a service retirement benefit' whereas ORS 238.280 uses mandatory language stating they 'shall be retired upon written application,' potentially making a statutory requirement discretionary.

OAR 459-009-0098 exempts employers with fewer than 5 active members from the statutory requirement that contribution amounts be 'actuarially necessary to adequately fund the benefits' by allowing PERS to apply a system-wide average rate instead.

The rule permits payment of balance due after the member's retirement date when PERS sets a later deadline, but the statute requires full payment 'on or before the effective date of retirement.'

OAR 459-011-0115(4)(a) allows payment 'within 90 days before or after the member's effective retirement date' for members at earliest retirement age, while the statute specifies payment 'within 90 days of the member's effective date of retirement,' which does not explicitly allow payment before retirement.

Rule 459-011-0100(3)(f) defines 'uniformed services' but omits the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration commissioned corps, which the statute includes at ORS 238.156(5)(b)(D).

Rule 459-011-0100(3)(f) defines 'uniformed services' to include 'Army National Guard' and 'Air National Guard' without the statutory limitation that they must be 'when the employee is engaged in active duty for training, inactive duty for training or full-time National Guard duty,' whereas rule 459-011-0115(1)(d) correctly includes this limitation.

ORS 238.300(1) requires that if a member dies before the first payment is due, the member account shall be treated as though death had occurred before retirement, but the rule instead provides that retirement benefit options selected pursuant to ORS 238.300 or 238.305 determine how benefits are paid.

OAR 459-045-0030 rule (5) extends dispute rights and deadlines to alternate payees, but the declared statute ORS 238.450 applies only to members who apply for retirement allowances.

The rule extends the deadline for payment beyond the 90-day window stated in the statute when PERS adjusts the purchase cost upward after the initial payment period.

Rule 459-009-0020 declares it implements ORS 238.205 but its operative text never actually engages with any substantive provision of that statute; it only addresses the definition of 'public employer' from ORS 238.005.

The rule gives PERS discretion to set a deadline for additional payments that could extend beyond the 90-day requirement in the statute.

OAR 459-040-0060(3) adds a six-year service requirement not found in the statute for beneficiary payments when a judge member dies before retiring with no surviving spouse.

ORS 238.585(3) allows restoration of forfeited rights if a person becomes a judge member within five years, but OAR 459-040-0010(8) makes it impossible for anyone age 72 or older to become a judge member, preventing those individuals from accessing the restoration mechanism.

The statute requires an eligible retired member to be 'eligible for federal Medicare coverage,' but the implementing rule requires enrollment in Parts A and B of Medicare, which is narrower.

OAR 459-015-0020(8)(b) specifies a 180-day deadline where ORS 238.320(5) states 'six months,' which are not numerically equivalent in calendar application.

OAR 459-015-0020(7) imposes a 90-day filing deadline for active members who become disabled but do not terminate employment, a party and situation not explicitly addressed in ORS 238.320.

The statute ORS 238.088(3) excludes members who 'retire under the provisions of ORS 238.280(1), (2) or (3)' from the benefit of 238.088(2), but the rule OAR 459-017-0060(4)(g) narrows this exclusion to apply only to those who 'retired at a reduced benefit' under those provisions, thereby including persons the statute appears to exclude.

Rule 459-011-0500(4) adds a requirement that a member be 'in a covered group on or after the effective date' of an employer's election, but the statute only requires the employer's request to be in effect 'at the time of the member's separation.'

OAR 459-005-0250(1)(c) charges a flat $60 fee for retirement benefit estimates beyond 2 per calendar year without requiring the 'extraordinary costs' determination the statute mandates.

The rule permits adjustments to verified amounts for USERRA compliance, judgments/settlements, and account divisions, which are not listed among the four post-verification adjustments authorized by the statute.

OAR 459-005-0225(2) requires all payments by PERS employers to be made by electronic funds transfer, but ORS 293.525(1)(a) permits agencies to require only payments 'above designated amounts' to be made by electronic funds transfer.

OAR 459-005-0620 lists nine criteria for uncollectible debt but omits the requirement that criteria must include the right of offset, which the statute explicitly mandates.

The rule sets a maximum fee of $12,500, while the statute sets it at $7,500.

OAR 839-025-0005(4) allows a 90-day pending period for outstanding information, which extends beyond the 60-day determination deadline specified in the statute.

Rule 839-025-0320(2) treats payment by a surety or public agency as a violation, but ORS 279C.840(6)(d)(B) explicitly allows such payment as an exception to the prohibition in subsection (6)(a).

Rule 839-025-0033(3) converts the statute's discretionary 'preferably shall be posted in the same place' requirement into a mandatory 'must be posted in the same location' requirement.

OAR 839-025-0085(1) makes the commissioner's determination discretionary with 'may determine' language, while ORS 279C.860(1) mandates it with 'shall add' language, making an absolute statutory duty optional in the rule.

The rule declares it implements ORS 279C.306, but sections (2) and (3) addressing advance filing of planned public improvements and cost analyses do not engage with that statute, which covers only complaint procedures and administrative enforcement after violations are alleged.

The rule's definition of what "public works" does not include omits an entire statutory exclusion for private nonprofit entity renovations of publicly owned real property meeting specific conditions.

The statute defines the career-school licensure scope as "345.010 to 345.340"; three OAR rules from two agencies consistently cite "345.010 to 345.450" instead.

Two rules implementing the same anti-discrimination statute (ORS 345.240) define the protected-class list differently — one includes 'veterans' status,' the other doesn't.

OAR 839-005-0320(1) states that pursuant to ORS 345.120, the Superintendent of Public Instruction has authority to suspend or revoke licenses, but ORS 345.120(3) vests that authority in the Higher Education Coordinating Commission, not the Superintendent.

The statute limits ORS 345.240 to career schools licensed under ORS 345.010 to 345.340, but multiple rules extend coverage to ORS 345.010 to 345.450

The statute limits ORS 345.240 to career schools licensed under ORS 345.010 to 345.340, but the rule definition extends coverage to ORS 345.010 to 345.450

OAR 839-005-0305(3) defines discrimination based on protected classes but omits 'gender identity,' which ORS 659.850(1) lists as a separate protected class.

OAR 839-050-0030(6) excludes intervening aggrieved persons in housing cases from the definition of 'party' for service purposes, directly conflicting with OAR 839-050-0170(3) which states aggrieved persons 'may intervene and be joined as a party' in the same proceedings.

The rule declares it implements ORS 659A.049, which establishes that reinstatement rights cannot be forfeited if a worker refuses to return without physician or nurse practitioner release, but the operative text of the rule never addresses medical clearance, physician release, or the conditions under which reinstatement rights are forfeited.

Both rules declare they implement ORS 659A.800-659A.890, but their operative text does not address ORS 659A.865 violations, which is the specific subject matter of ORS 659A.890.

OAR 839-014-0600 defines 'reasonable access' as requiring a telephone to be located at the housing or within one-tenth of one mile, while OAR 839-014-0620 requires 'reasonable access' to be within a two-mile radius, creating conflicting distance thresholds for the same term in the same regulatory scheme.

The rule adds an exemption from deductions for serious health conditions that the statute does not explicitly provide.

OAR 839-010-0010(5) drops nonprofit organization employees and board members from the definition of 'Employee' that ORS 659A.200(2) explicitly includes.

OAR 839-010-0010(3) removes 'discrimination' from the explicit examples of disciplinary action listed in ORS 659A.200(1).

Rule (7) adds cease and desist orders as a remedy, but the statute ORS 659A.550(4) specifies only civil penalties under ORS 659A.855.

Rule declares a substantive guarantee of rights to employment, housing, public accommodation, and private schools, while the statute only states purposes and legislative intent to create education programs, remedies, and administrative machinery.

OAR 839-050-0080(3) cross-references ORS 659A.870(4)(b) for the election to have a matter heard in circuit court, but that provision is about back pay calculation; the election provision is at ORS 659A.870(5)(b).

The rule omits statutory factors required to be considered when determining whether an accommodation imposes undue hardship, specifically the reference to school district obligations and the special undue hardship rules for school districts.

The rule drops the phrase 'in accordance with the employee's sincerely held religious beliefs' from the statutory requirement that an occupational requirement restricts the ability to wear religious clothing.

Rules 2 and 3 declare they implement ORS 659A.233, which applies to all employers, but the rules limit application only to public employers and public employees.

The rule explicitly includes public bodies as employers with extensive specification, while the statute uses only the general term 'any person' without such enumeration.

The rule adds a conditional age exception (26 years or older) to the statutory exclusion of those employed by parents in domestic service, narrowing which individuals are excluded from the definition of employee.

OAR 839-006-0136 adds two grounds for losing reemployment rights—discharge for bona fide non-injury-related reasons and abandonment—that ORS 659A.046(3) does not enumerate.

The rules omit 'bias' from the definition of covered employer and eligible employee, even though the statute explicitly includes 'bias' alongside domestic violence, harassment, sexual assault, and stalking.

OAR 839-009-0362(4) cites to OAR 839-009-0340(14), (15), (16) and (17) for victim type definitions, but those subsection numbers do not contain victim type definitions; the actual victim type definitions are in subsections (8), (9), (11) and (12).

Rule 839-010-0100(2) extends protection to situations where the employer merely believes the employee engaged in protected activity, adding language not present in the statute.

Rule 839-010-0100(2)(b) protects reporting of activities the employee believed to be criminal, whereas the statute protects only reporting of actual criminal activity.

Rule 839-010-0140(3) extends protection based on the employer's belief that the employee engaged in protected civil proceedings activity, not limited to actual engagement as the statute requires.

Rule oar-839-006-0280 declares it implements ORS 659A.104, but its operative text never engages with ORS 659A.104 at all—the rule defines state government, executive department, judicial department, and legislative department, while the statute defines disability, major life activities, substantially limits, and related terms.

The rule at subsection (9) contains a cross-reference error: it references subsections (5) and (7), but based on the rule's renumbering of the statute, it should reference subsections (8) and (10) to maintain consistency with the statute's intent.

The rule applies the lift system requirement to all transient lodging facilities with 175+ rooms, but the statute limits it only to those facilities that are newly constructed or altered in a manner affecting usability.

Rule 839-009-0220(2) allows employers discretion to apply whichever OFLA or FMLA provision is 'more beneficial,' whereas the statute mandates that when leave qualifies under both, it must be taken concurrently and not in addition.

OAR 839-005-0075(3)(b) omits several entities from the statutory list of employers from which peace officers can be commissioned.

OAR 839-005-0070(2) adds an adverse impact discrimination standard that does not appear in the statute.

The statute authorizes the Attorney General and Commissioner to file housing discrimination complaints under 659A.825(1)(c), but the rule states 'This section does not apply to housing discrimination complaints,' excluding them from its scope while declaring to implement that statute.

Rules extend statutory protection for testimony to include workers 'about to give testimony' and those 'perceived as having testified,' beyond the statute's protection for those who have 'given testimony'

The rule states as a general principle that an unlawful compensation practice occurs each time remuneration is paid, but the statute limits this principle specifically to time limitation purposes.

Rule 839-009-0240(6)(c) allows employers to reduce OFLA leave after an employee refuses a suitable offer under ORS 659A.043(3)(a)(D), but the statute mandates automatic commencement of family leave upon such refusal without reduction.

Rules cite ORS 192.410 to 192.505 for confidentiality of settlement discussions when implementing a statute that cites ORS 192.311 to 192.478 for the same prohibition.

Rule 839-005-0125 declares implementation of ORS 659A.030(1)(f), which concerns age disclosure in employment applications, but the rule's operative text addresses retaliation for protected activity, which is the subject of ORS 659A.030(1)(g).

OAR 839-003-0245(1) allows the commissioner to file a complaint based on "reason to believe," but ORS 659A.885(9) requires "reasonable cause to believe" and explicitly requires proof of "a pattern or practice of resistance" or that "a group of persons has been denied" (past/present), not future potential denial.

OAR 839-006-0280 declares it implements ORS 659A.139 (a statute about constructing disability discrimination provisions in favor of broad coverage and consistency with federal ADA) but its operative text defines state government, executive department, judicial department, and legislative department—subjects that do not engage with ORS 659A.139's construction principle at all.

Rule 839-014-0620 establishes a commissioner-based dispute resolution process for telephone access terms, while ORS 659A.262 establishes only a judicial process (magistrate/court) for disputes about access to housing.

Rule adds age limits for children in certain leave contexts that the statute's family member definition does not contain.

Rule's catch-all for family members by affinity does not include blood-related individuals meeting the statute's equivalent-family-relationship test.

Rule adds an exception allowing compensable injury leave to count as OFLA leave under certain circumstances, contradicting the statute's absolute exclusion.

Rule 839-014-0610 omits the statutory requirement for a telephone located within two miles for employee private use, implementing only the emergency access requirement.

Rule 839-005-0026(2) conditions the prohibition on pregnancy benefits discrimination to situations 'when employee and dependent spouse or domestic partner benefits exist for other medical conditions,' but the statute requires equal treatment without this conditional limitation.

Rules declare implementation of ORS 659A.200 - ORS 659A.224, but the operative text of each rule never engages with ORS 659A.224 itself, which is only a short title provision stating the range 'shall be known as the Whistleblower Law.' The rules cite and implement only other statutes within that range (e.g., ORS 659A.203, 659A.206, 659A.212).

OAR 839-003-0010(4) authorizes the commissioner and attorney general to file complaints on their own initiative, but ORS 659A.820(2) limits filing to 'any person claiming to be aggrieved' and does not authorize enforcement-initiated complaints.

OAR 839-003-0040(3) prohibits adding new facts when amending employment complaints, but OAR 839-003-0205(1) explicitly allows adding new factual allegations when amending housing discrimination complaints, with both rules claiming to implement ORS 659A.820.

Rule 839-020-0051 section (4) requires all employers to provide reasonable accommodation for expression of milk limitations, but ORS 659A.148 limits the requirements of ORS 659A.147 to employers with six or more employees.

OAR 839-006-0345 applies its rules to 'a place of public accommodation or of access to state government services, programs or activities,' but ORS 659A.400 defines only 'place of public accommodation' (which includes public body services to the public, but not all state government access).

Rule 839-009-0363(2) conditions the right to use accrued paid leave on taking leave pursuant to an agreement, CBA, or employer policy, whereas the statute allows any eligible employee taking leave to use accrued paid leave without such a condition.

Both rules declare they implement ORS 659A.106, but their operative text never engages with ORS 659A.106's actual subject matter: the six-or-more-employee threshold and the Oregon National Guard exception.

The rules omit 'bias' as a protected category from the unlawful employment practices that the statute explicitly includes in ORS 659A.290(2)(a), (b), and (c), and from the certification requirements in OAR 839-005-0170(4).

Rule section (1)(e) omits subsection (A) from the statute's list of protected refusals, removing protection against penalization for refusing to establish or maintain a personal social media account.

Rule section (1)(f) omits subsection (A) from the statute's list of protected refusals, removing protection against hiring decisions based on refusal to establish or maintain a personal social media account.

The rule cites 'ORS 408.240 to 408.240' where the statute requires 'ORS 408.240 to 408.280 and 408.290', removing the range up to 408.280.